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Removal of Women and African Americans in Jury
Selection in South Carolina Capital Cases, 1997-2012
Ann M. Eisenberg*

Abstract
The Supreme Court’s May 2016 decision in Foster v. Chatman
involved smoking-gun evidence that the state of Georgia discriminated against
prospective black jurors during jury selection in Foster’s 1987 capital trial.
Foster was decided on the thirtieth anniversary of Batson v. Kentucky, the
first in the line of cases to prohibit striking prospective jurors on the basis of
their race or gender. But the evidence of discrimination for Batson challenges is
rarely so obvious and available as it was in Foster.
While litigants have struggled to produce evidence of discrimination
in individual cases, empirical studies have been able to assess jury selection
practices through a broader lens. This Article uses original data gathered from
trial transcripts to examine race- and gender-related exclusion of potential
jurors during several stages of jury selection in a set of thirty-five South
Carolina cases that resulted in death sentences from 1997 to 2012. It includes
observations for over 3,000 venire members for gender and observations for
over 1,000 venire members for race. This is one of few studies to examine the
use of peremptory strikes in actual trials; no previous studies of this magnitude
have examined this topic in South Carolina.
Consistent with comparable studies, this study’s results — although
limited in their generalizability due to data limitations — revealed that white
and black potential jurors had substantially different experiences on their path
to the jury box, while gender played a subtler role. Some of the findings included
that prosecutors used peremptory strikes against 35% of eligible black venire
*

Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. This Article is
dedicated to my father, the late Professor Theodore Eisenberg, who also offered
input and provided assistance with data analysis for an earlier draft. I am grateful
to the Office of Appellate Defense, a division of the South Carolina Office of
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Fadahunsi, Ph.D. Candidate, West Virginia University Department of Statistics,
for data analysis support on the final version of the Article; and to Cornell Law
School clinic students, including Mahats Miller, who contributed to data entry.
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members in the data set, compared to 12% of eligible white venire members,
and that the death-qualification process impeded a substantial number of black
venire members from serving. These disparities contributed to overrepresentation
of whites on the juries. The study’s findings call into question the fairness of
some of South Carolina’s current death row inmates’ trials, and buttress the
argument that capital conviction and sentencing procedures are incompatible
with the need for representative and impartial juries.
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Introduction

The Supreme Court’s May 2016 decision in Foster v.
Chatman1 involved smoking-gun evidence that the state of Georgia
discriminated against black prospective jurors during jury selection
in Foster’s 1987 capital trial. Prosecutors’ files included a list of black
venire members’ names highlighted in green with “B” next to them,
and the handwritten note, “NO Black Church,” among other things.2
Prosecutors struck all four black prospective jurors who had been
qualified to serve, resulting in an all-white jury.3 The Court found, in
contrast to the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding, that “the focus on
race in the prosecution’s file plainly demonstrates a concerted effort
to keep black prospective jurors off the jury.”4
Foster was decided on the thirtieth anniversary of Batson
v. Kentucky,5 the first in the line of cases to prohibit striking
prospective jurors on the basis of their race or gender.6 But, Foster
notwithstanding, this line of cases is known for its impotence.7 The
main difficulty arises when litigants seek to pursue Batson and related
challenges, which they begin by making a prima facie showing that
a peremptory strike was exercised on a prohibited basis — the first
1
2

3
4
5
6
7

136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
Id. at 1744. Additional evidence included a note from an investigator who
worked with the prosecution, stating, “[I]f we had to pick a black juror I
recommend that [this juror] be one of the jurors”; a list titled “definite NO’s,”
which included six names, five of which were black prospective jurors (one of
whom was disqualified for connection to the case prior to the strike stage);
and the jurors’ questionnaires, where their responses indicating their race had
been circled. Id.
Id. at 1743.
Id. at 1755.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. J.E.B. v. Alabama extended Batson’s prohibition on discrimination to gender.
511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
See, e.g., Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, Report on
Jury Selection Study 11-13 (2011), http://digitalcommons.law.
msu.edu/facpubs/331/; Equal Justice Initiative, Illegal Racial
Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy 4 (Aug.
2010), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-juryselection.pdf (“Today in America, there is perhaps no arena of public life or
governmental administration where racial discrimination is more widespread,
apparent, and seemingly tolerated than in the selection of juries.”); Valerie
P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks?, 78 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 1179 (2003); Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing
Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15
Mich. J. Race & L. 57, 61-62, 83 (2009).
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step in a three-step process to evaluate the claim.8 Under the second
step, the striking party need only respond to the prima facie showing
with a race- or gender-neutral basis for the strike.9 Under the third
step, the court determines whether to accept the rationale as nondiscriminatory.10 The neutral bases put forth in the second step have
been called an “unbounded collection of justifications” that “run the
gamut.”11 But, the Supreme Court has directed courts to accept even
“silly or superstitious” explanations if they appear race- and genderneutral.12 Rarely is the evidence of discrimination as compelling and
available as it was in Foster, and rarely do defendants succeed in their
Batson challenges.13
While litigants have struggled to produce evidence of
discrimination in individual cases, empirical studies have been able
to assess jury selection practices through a broader lens.14 This
Article adds original data from the state of South Carolina to the
empirical literature examining discrimination in jury selection in
capital cases. The Article assesses whether the processes of venire
selection, voir dire, and the peremptory striking of the jury resulted
in disproportionate removal of women and African Americans on
juries in a set of thirty-five South Carolina jury trials resulting in
death sentences from 1997 to 2012.15 It is one of “only a handful
of published studies” to examine these issues in actual trials rather
than simulated experiments.16 All cases were used to observe
8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15

16

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008).
Id. at 477.
Id.
Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 Cornell L.
Rev. 1075, 1093 (2011).
Id. at 1096 (discussing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)).
Cf. Jessica Gabel Cino, Gabel on Foster v. Chatman: Stating the Obvious While
Setting an Impossible Precedent, Ga. State Univ. Coll. of Law (May 26,
2016), http://law.gsu.edu/2016/05/26/gabel-on-foster-v-chatman-statingthe-obvious-while-setting-an-impossible-precedent/.
Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey and Batson: The North Carolina
Racial Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory Challenges in Death Cases, 10 Ohio
St. J. Crim. L. 103, 104 (2012).
The limitations of this study are addressed in more detail below, but it is
notable that the thirty-five cases are a sample of an estimated sixty-three death
sentences imposed after jury trials in South Carolina for the period of 1997 to
2012. The cases were chosen based on the availability of trial transcripts that
included relevant data. See infra Part (IV)(A). Other cases were not included
because of inaccessibility to the author or inconsistent reporting among courts.
Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming
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gender as a factor in removal, including observations for 3,031
venire persons, while a subset of twenty-three cases was used to
observe prospective jurors’ race, including observations for 1,088
individuals. The Article assesses whether certain jury pools at the
outset were racially representative of the defendants’ respective
communities; whether, and if so, why women and African Americans
were removed disproportionately during voir dire; and how defense
and prosecution exercised their peremptory strikes among whites
versus blacks and men versus women.
Because the question of support for the death penalty
tends to differ across race and gender lines,17 this study focuses in
particular on removal for cause for opposition to, or support for, the
death penalty. Capital juries are typically “death-qualified,” or put
through a questioning process to ensure they are willing to impose
a death sentence upon the defendant.18 Although the Supreme
Court has stated that capital juries have the mandate to “express
the conscience of the community,”19 the death-qualification process
means that judges in capital trials remove prospective jurors who
oppose the death penalty due to a presupposed inability to apply
the law impartially.20 As a result, approximately one-third of the
population, most of whom are women or African Americans, is likely

17
18

19
20

Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials,
97 Iowa L. Rev. 1531, 1538 (2012).
Id. at 1534, 1550.
See John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 195, 245
n.353 (2009); Richard Salgado, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for A
Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green,
2005 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 519, 521 (2005) (“Despite arguments that the voir dire
practice of death-qualifying a jury creates a predisposition toward finding
guilt, the Supreme Court has held the practice constitutional. While the Court
has affirmed that the prosecution is entitled to death-qualify the sentencing
jury, and that death-qualifying a jury does not violate a defendant’s rights per
se, the Court has not mandated that a jury be death-qualified before the initial
guilt phase of the trial or that the same, unitary jury hear both phases. Thus,
courts are given the discretion to death-qualify the jury—with an eye towards
the sentencing phase—before the guilt phase has been conducted, or to seek
some other alternative such as a bifurcated jury instead.”) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis omitted); State v. Spann, 308 S.E.2d 518, 519-20 (1983)
(“When a potential juror is prevented from rendering an impartial decision
or voting for the death penalty, the trial court can exclude him because of his
inability to carry out his duty under the law.”).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 172 (1986).
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to be removed from capital juries because of such beliefs.21
The results of this study show that prospective jurors’ race
played a critical role during the jury selection process, resulting
in disproportionate representation of whites, whereas prospective
jurors’ gender told a slightly subtler story.22 These findings merit
attention for several reasons. At the broadest level, discriminatory
jury selection practices implicate the legitimacy of the legal system.
Juries’ purpose is to “guard against the exercise of arbitrary power.”23
But, unrepresentative juries may do just the opposite, leading to
unpredictable and discriminatory outcomes.24 Arbitrariness in the
administration of justice undermines society’s trust in the rule of
law and violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.25
Unrepresentative juries are also particularly problematic in
capital cases. Most critically, death-qualified juries are more inclined
to return convictions and death sentences, undermining defendants’
21

22

23
24

25

See Joseph Carroll, Who Supports the Death Penalty?, Death Penalty Info.
Ctr. (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/gallup-poll-whosupports-death-penalty. As discussed in more detail below, see infra Part II(A),
the Court has upheld death-qualification’s effects on jury representativeness
because “fair cross section” jurisprudence does not apply to petit juries and
even if it did, those who oppose capital punishment do not themselves form a
distinctive group. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 415 (1987). Another
third of the population is ineligible to serve as capital jurors because they
would vote for death automatically if the defendant were found guilty of
murder. John Blume, An Overview of Significant Findings from the Capital
Jury Project and Other Empirical Studies of the Death Penalty Relevant to Jury
Selection, Presentation of Evidence and Jury Instructions in Capital Cases 5
(Spring 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/
research/death-penalty-project/upload/empirical-studies-summariesrevised-spring-2010.docx).
The causal effect of these characteristics cannot be proven with certainty because
of the absence of controls or the use of regression analysis. However, some causal
effect can reasonably be inferred based on the data’s consistency with previous
studies that did use such controls and methods. See infra Parts III-V.
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
See id. at 531; David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital
Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 3, 103-08, 12425 (2001); Janell Ross, How big of a difference does an all-white jury make? A leading
expert explains., Wash. Post (May 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/30/how-big-a-difference-does-an-all-whitejury-make-a-leading-expert-explains/?utm_term=.fe62be75a8e2 (discussing
research illustrating relationships between jury racial composition and
arbitrary trial outcomes).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
239-40 (1972).
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rights to an impartial jury.26 Processes that siphon women and
black venire members off of juries undermine juries’ fairness and
effectiveness in numerous other ways as well: more diverse juries are
likelier to “engage in wider-ranging deliberations,” to address issues
of race in their deliberations, and to counterbalance other jurors’
biases.27 Because South Carolina jury selection has many similarities
with jury selection in other states, the findings discussed here likely
reflect issues with capital jury representativeness and fairness that
arise throughout the justice system.28
Most immediately, the data discussed here have implications
for the thirty-eight South Carolina inmates on death row as of this
writing.29 The most compelling racial disparity revealed by this
study is comparable to that revealed in a study of the same topic in
North Carolina by Catherine Grosso and Barbara O’Brien.30 Their
study has been the subject of ongoing litigation over the validity of
certain North Carolina inmates’ capital sentences.31 Twenty-nine of
26

27
28

29
30
31

Jill M. Cochran, Note, Courting Death: 30 Years Since Furman, Is the Death
Penalty Any Less Discriminatory? Looking at the Problem of Jury Discretion in Capital
Sentencing, 38 Val. U. L. Rev. 1399, 1444 (2004); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney,
Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition and the
“Empathic Divide,” 45 Law & Soc’y Rev. 69, 73 (2011).
Erin York Cornwell & Valerie P. Hans, Representation Through Participation:
A Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 Law & Soc’y Rev. 667, 668-69
(2011).
See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and
Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. Legal Stud. 277, 282 (2001). Aspects
of South Carolina’s history stand out, however. As of 2002, “[o]nly six states
ha[d] executed more death-sentenced inmates,” making South Carolina’s
execution rate relatively high compared to its murder rate. John Blume, TwentyFive Years of Death: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty Project on the “Modern” Era
of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 285, 292-93, 297 (2002).
Further, although this may be the case in other states, race continues to play a
substantial role in South Carolina’s capital punishment scheme. For instance,
“substantial variation exists in South Carolina’s death sentencing rates when
the race of the defendant and the race of the victim are taken into account.
African-Americans who kill whites are sentenced to death at approximately
three times the rate of whites who kill whites . . . [A] person charged with
killing someone who is white is more than seven times more likely to be
sentenced to death than a person charged with killing an African-American.”
Id. at 298.
S.C. Dep’t of Corr., Death Row List (2017), http://www.doc.sc.gov/
pubweb/news/death-row-report.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
See O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7.
State v. Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151 (N.C. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 67
(2016). Grosso’s and O’Brien’s study was used pursuant to a provision of
North Carolina’s now-repealed Racial Justice Act, which created a cause
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South Carolina’s current death row inmates had sentences imposed
from 1997 to 2012.32 This study includes twelve of their trials, with
information on juror race available for eight.33 Although the limited
generalizability of the data is addressed in more depth below, the
fairness of South Carolina’s jury selection processes for these trials
is of interest in and of itself.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II.A explains the
significance of jurors’ race and gender in the context of capital
punishment. Part II.B describes the relationship between race and
gender and specific pre-trial procedures for jury empanelment, as
well as relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence, including Taylor
v. Louisiana,34 Witherspoon v. Illinois,35 and Batson v. Kentucky36 and
related judgments.37 Part III surveys literature and empirical studies
examining race and gender in capital punishment. Part IV.A explains
the methodology of the instant study and addresses its limitations,
such as the limited availability of trial transcripts and the absence
of controls for race- and gender-neutral bases for removal. Part
IV.B provides the results of the empirical analysis of the data.
Part V discusses the data’s implications, including the difficulty
of reconciling jury representativeness with capital conviction and
sentencing procedures.

32
33

34
35
36
37

of action for death row inmates to use statistical evidence revealing racial
discrimination in their trials. See infra Part III.
See S.C. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 29.
The trials included in this study where the inmates are currently on death row
are State v. Aleksey, 538 S.E.2d 248 (S.C. 2000), State v. Bixby, 698 S.E.2d
572 (S.C. 2010), State v. Bryant, 642 S.E.2d 582 (S.C. 2007), State v. Finklea,
697 S.E.2d 543 (S.C. 2010), State v. Lindsey, 642 S.E.2d 557 (S.C. 2007),
State v. Owens, 664 S.E.2d 80 (S.C. 2008), State v. Sigmon, 623 S.E.2d 648
(S.C. 2005), State v. Starnes, 531 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 2000) (“Starnes I”), State
v. Starnes, 698 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 2010) (“Starnes II”), State v. Williams, 690
S.E.2d 62 (S.C. 2010), State v. Winkler, 698 S.E.2d 596 (S.C. 2010), State v.
Woods, 676 S.E.2d 128 (S.C. 2009). The cases among these with information
containing juror race are Aleksey, Bryant, Finklea, Lindsey, Sigmon, Starnes I,
Williams, and Woods.
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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II. The Significance of Jurors’ Race and Gender
A. Jury Composition Influences Case Outcomes, Particularly
in Capital Cases
Jurors’ traits are not generally outcome-determinative.38
Rather, “verdicts usually depend more on the facts of the case
and less on the personal characteristics of the jurors.”39 Thus,
“[d]etermining whether race, sex, or other juror characteristics
influence how capital case jurors vote is difficult. Jurors tend to vote
for death in more egregious cases and for life in less egregious cases
no matter what their own characteristics.”40
Nevertheless, juror characteristics do influence jury
deliberations and verdicts in capital cases.41 Capital cases differ from
other trials in the gravity of the potential penalty, the amount of
discretion given to the jury, and the bifurcation of the trial between
the verdict and penalty phases.42 For instance, in the sentencing
phase in South Carolina, jurors are given a list of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and are told only that they may choose a
life sentence instead of death for “any reason or no reason at all.”43
“[C]ompared to most jury decisions,” Theodore Eisenberg and
colleagues argue, “[b]ecause capital sentencing is so discretionary,
considerable room exists for a juror’s personal characteristics to
influence her judgment.”44
Various studies have shown that the racial composition of a
jury influences the likelihood of the jury imposing a death sentence.45
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45

See Eisenberg et al., supra note 28.
Id.
Id. at 277.
See id. at 283, 285-86, 308 (noting influence of jurors’ race and religion on
juror voting).
See id. at 282.
Id. at 283.
Id.; see also David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty
in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings
from Philadelphia, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638, 1643 (1998) (“The potential
influence of race in the administration of the death penalty takes root in the
broad exercise of discretion that state laws grant prosecutors and juries.”);
Lynch & Haney, supra note 26, at 69 (discussing the additional potential for
reliance on racial stereotypes in capital cases).
E.g., William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner, & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing
in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial
Composition, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 171, 195 (2001); Mustafa El-Farra, Race
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In particular, white jurors are more likely to vote for death than black
jurors,46 men are more likely to vote for death than women,47 and
“support for the death penalty among whites is highly correlated with
measures of anti-black racial prejudice and stereotyping.”48 Further,
“the more a juror supports the death penalty, the more likely she is
to find a criminal defendant (capital and noncapital alike) guilty in
the first place,” and more likely to ultimately vote for death.49 Other
juror characteristics, such as religion, influence outcomes as well.50
The Supreme Court and Congress have acknowledged an
interest in having proportional representation of the community
on juries.51 Indeed, “[a]s early as the twelfth century, English
law recognized the danger that inhered in allowing members of a
minority community to be tried entirely by . . . majority jurors.”52
Not only does a representative jury seem and act more neutral, better
reflect the judgment of the community, promote public confidence
in the judicial process, and keep the justice system from becoming
“the organ of any special group or class,”53 it also eases the potential
blow of the “minority effect,” where a minority faction of less than
three on a particular jury tends to be overwhelmed by the stance of
the majority.54 Diversity also allows a jury to serve its democratic
and political functions more effectively, acting as a “check on
government functionaries,”55 “guard[ing] against the exercise of
arbitrary power,”56 and counteracting the biases or zealotry of judges

46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53
54
55
56

and the Jury: Racial Influences on Jury Decision-Making in Death Penalty Cases, 4
Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 219, 226 (2006); Lynch & Haney, supra
note 26, at 84 (“[T]here were differences in final case outcomes as a function
of defendant race and ratio of white men on the jury.”).
Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 298.
Lynch & Haney, supra note 26, at 69.
Id. at 73.
Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 283-84.
See id. at 285-86.
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1993); e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1940);
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
527 (1975).
Hiroshi Fukurai, The Representative Jury Requirement: Jury Representativeness and
Cross Sectional Participation from the Beginning to the End of the Jury Selection Process,
in The Jury System: Contemporary Scholarship 169-70 (Valerie
Hans ed., 2006).
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942); Fukurai, supra note 52, at
170, 172.
Fukurai, supra note 52, at 170.
Id. at 172.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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and prosecutors.57
Thus, the composition of the jury is central to a trial, with the
stakes higher and the effects stronger in capital cases. As is the case
in South Carolina,58 “the typical jury exercises virtually complete
discretion on the life or death decision once it finds a statutory
aggravating circumstance present in the case.”59 Given the nearly
1,000-year-old common law value in having a representative jury
render such grave decisions, the mechanisms for filling the jury box
represent much more than simple administrative procedure.
B. The Centrality of Jury Composition Underscores the
Importance of Empanelment Procedures, Each of Which
Interacts with Prospective Jurors’ Race and Gender
In light of the impact that the composition of juries can have
in capital cases, the pre-trial processes of venire selection, voir dire,
and the use of peremptory strikes wield significant influence over
each case as a whole. The discussion below addresses how each phase
uniquely interacts with the empanelment or removal of women and
black venire members.
1.

The Venire Selection Process

The venire selection process typically involves two steps.
“First, a list of names from which the venire can be drawn must
be compiled . . . Second, names from the source list are [randomly]
selected to form the jury venire.”60 Defendants are not entitled to
a jury composed in whole or in part of members of their race.61
However, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court required venire
selection to draw from a “fair cross section of the community” as
a fundamental aspect of the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.62 Taylor also held that the Equal Protection Clause
57
58
59
60
61
62

Fukurai, supra note 52, at 172 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31 and Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 282-83.
Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 1644.
Mark McGillis, Jury Venires: Eliminating the Discrimination Factor by Using a
Statistical Approach, 3 How. Scroll: Soc. Just. L. Rev. 17, 17 (1995).
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury”); Taylor, 419 U.S.
at 528.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits systematic exclusion of
particular racial (or gender) groups from jury service.”63
Taylor’s mandate is often not the practice in reality, however.
Taylor v. Louisiana and its progeny “offer[] no specific mechanism to
guarantee the cross-sectional representation on the jury itself,”64 and
venires continue to demonstrate disproportionate representation.65
As Hiroshi Fukurai explains:
One recurrent problem with this method is that
randomly selected jury panels are not always fully
or regularly representative of all segments of the
relevant community. More specifically, racial and
ethnic minorities, as well as the young, old, and
the poor, are consistently underrepresented in most
federal and state court jury pools and venires.66
Voter and driver registration lists are the most commonly
used sources and are perhaps the most comprehensive lists of
citizens available.67 But “each has significant deficiencies with regard
to inclusiveness and representativeness.”68 Voter lists may exclude
as much as one third of the adult population, neglecting racial
minorities in particular, while driver registration lists underrepresent
women and the elderly.69 The actual impact of the fair cross-section
doctrine has itself never been critically assessed.70

63

64
65
66

67
68
69
70

Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526-33; see also Duncan, supra note 57, at 149 (applying
Sixth Amendment to states); Heather Davenport, Note, Blinking Reality: Race
and Criminal Jury Selection in Light of Ovalle, Miller-El, and Johnson, 58 Baylor
L. Rev. 949, 955 (2006).
Fukurai, supra note 52, at 171 (emphasis added).
E.g., Valerie P. Hans, Jury Representativeness: It’s No Joke in the State of New York,
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y Blog (Jan. 20, 2012), http://jlpp.org/blogzine/
jury-representativeness-its-no-joke-in-the-state-of-new-york/.
Fukurai, supra note 52, at 144 (explaining four reasons behind these lacunae:
underrepresentation on voter registration lists, exclusionary screening
questions (such as inquiries about economic hardship), subjective selection
criteria focusing on integrity and character, and failure to examine the rights
of excluded jurors).
Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 148.
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2. Removals for Cause during Voir Dire
After venire members arrive to court, the voir dire stage
poses a second hurdle on their path to the jury box. During voir dire,
which is usually lengthier for capital cases, the court deems jurors
to be “qualified” or “unqualified” after their views have been vetted
through questioning and cross-examination.71 Members of the
venire may be removed for bias or strong feelings; familiarity with
the case, parties, or witnesses; or any other experience or view that
may undermine impartiality in rendering a decision — including, in
capital cases, views on the death penalty.72
But, commentators note flaws inherent in the voir dire
process.73 Primarily, it is a subjective process that depends on
self-reporting. Jurors may not disclose their biases because they
are unaware of them, uncooperative, resentful of the court, or
apprehensive of being evaluated, among other reasons.74 Jurors
may also demonstrate inconsistency in self-assessments of their
own biases.75 Subjective standards for removals combined with
substantial judicial discretion might facilitate pretextual removals
based on discriminatory motivations, whether conscious or not.76
The South Carolina Supreme Court has affirmed that in
capital cases, “[a] prospective juror may be excluded for cause
when his or her views on capital punishment would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.”77
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of
this practice in Lockett v. Ohio.78 The parties may challenge venire
members they find biased or otherwise unqualified based on voir
dire questioning,79 but the decision as to whether to remove them is
within the sole discretion of the trial judge.80 Thus, in capital cases
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 149-50; see also Neil Vidmar & Valerie Hans, American Juries:
The Verdict 89, 93 (2007).
See Vidmar & Hans, supra note 71, at 93-94.
See, e.g., Hans & Jehle, supra note 7, at 1182.
Neil Vidmar, Case Studies of Pre- and Midtrial Prejudice in Criminal and Civil
Litigation, in The Jury System: Contemporary Scholarship 198-200
(Valerie Hans ed., 2006).
Id. at 200-05.
See Lee Smith, Note, Voir Dire in New Hampshire: A Flawed Process, 25 Vt. L.
Rev. 575, 592 (2001).
State v. Lindsey, 642 S.E.2d 557, 561 (S.C. 2007).
438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978).
See, e.g., State v. Bixby, 388 S.C. 528, 541 (2010).
Lindsey, 642 S.E.2d at 561.
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in South Carolina, judges frequently remove prospective jurors for
cause when the prospective jurors express strong reservations about
the death penalty, with the rationale that “[t]he state as well as the
accused [should] enjoy[] a right to an impartial jury.”81
An excerpt from the transcript of a 2007 South Carolina
capital trial82 illustrates the nature of questions posed to jurors and
the types of personal moral qualms that may preclude them from
serving on a capital jury:
Judge: I understand you’re . . . a pastor? . . .
Potential Juror: No, I am not a pastor, my wife is.
....
Judge: Could you as a juror in a sentencing phase,
depending upon the facts . . . and the law . . . render
a sentence of life imprisonment?
A: Judge, as I afore stated, my belief and my belief
biblically and also personally I feel that anyone can
be rehabilitated and I don’t feel that always life in
confinement is rehabilitation.
Judge: I see. . . . [A]s a juror in a sentencing
phase, . . . could you render a sentence of death? I
think I know but I do have to ask the question.
A: No, I do not feel that I could render a sentence of
death.
....
[M]y church and church family do take a
stand against the death penalty. And I do believe in
the scripture and the scripture teaches me . . . that
the word of God says that vengeance is mine saith
81
82

Bruce J. Winick, Witherspoon in Florida: Reflections on the Challenge for Cause of
Jurors in Capital Cases in a State in which the Judge Makes the Sentencing Decision, 37
U. Miami L. Rev. 825, 825-26 (1983).
Transcript of Record (on file with author).
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the Lord. And . . . thou shalt not kill. . . . I’m truly
against the death penalty.
Defense Attorney: . . . I think you also wrote [in your
questionnaire] that, my church teaches its members
to abide by state laws.
A: . . . [N]ot only my church, my bible also teaches
me, you know, that we should obey the rules of the
land as well as obey the rules of God. But in my
case, . . . I don’t think the laws of the land would also
let me do anything to go against what I believe in.
....
Defense Attorney: Please don’t think I’m trying to —
this is my situation, okay. I need a jury. The justice
system needs a jury full of people that have a bunch
of different backgrounds and views, okay.
....
A: . . . [I]f I don’t believe it in [sic] I just don’t feel
that I could give a honest, moral — I just don’t feel
that I could sit there and pass judgment . . . .
....
Judge: . . . As I say, the law does not require somebody
to do something they cannot in good conscience do.
And so that’s why we have these things, to find out
how people feel.
I, under the examination of this juror, I think
I’m going to excuse him from serving on the trial of
this case.83

83

Id. at 712-28.
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In a 2009 capital trial,84 another juror expressed similar concerns:
Potential Juror: I guess I would say — you know, you
guys are seeking the death penalty, and although I
don’t think this gentleman . . . deserves to live I think
my religious beliefs would stop me from penning
something saying that he got the death penalty . . . .
I’m just going to say, you know, I think he
deserves to be shot, I mean, I really do, but when it
comes down to it, I was raised Catholic . . . you know,
Jesus died for everybody . . . . Not just me, not just
you, but even the most heinous person out there he
died for —
Judge: Yes sir.
Potential Juror: — He died for, and who am I to say
that someone deserves to be put to death. That is not
my responsibility.
Judge: Yes sir.85
The dialogues above among judge, attorney, and venire
member demonstrate the probing inquiry in which counsel and
the court engage with each potential juror in capital cases. These
excerpts also illustrate the effect of a juror’s religion on his or her
potential exposure to removal.86
The influence of race and gender on individuals’ attitudes
and opinions toward capital punishment may be subtler than the
influence of religion. But the extended, highly personal quality
of these inquiries shows the room for jurors’ backgrounds and
experiences to affect their responses and likelihood of removal.
Although the prospective jurors above established relatively clear
84
85
86

Transcript of Record (on file with author).
Id. at 1157-58.
Grosso and O’Brien note that “some lower courts have prohibited strikes
based on religious affiliation.” Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1534 (citing
United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 2003); Andrew D. Leipold,
Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 Geo.
L.J. 945, 957 (1998)).
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reasons for their removal — their staunch opposition to the death
penalty — the nature of the questioning above also suggests an
element of subjectivity. Venire members could potentially be
removed for vaguer conscientious scruples. The subjectivity of the
process also illustrates the potential for pretextual challenges made
by attorneys with discriminatory motivations.
The Court has held constitutional the fact that removal for
opposition to the death penalty may have a disparate impact on
certain groups.87 In Lockhart v. McCree, the Court held that death
qualification does not violate Taylor or the right to an impartial jury
because people who object to the death penalty do not themselves
form a distinctive group.88 The following year, in Buchanan v. Kentucky,
the Court upheld death qualification’s disparate impacts on certain
groups because Taylor’s fair cross-section requirement applies only
to venires.89 The Court also reasoned that death qualification did not
involve excluding prospective jurors on the basis of race or gender,
but rather, “related to the [State’s] legitimate interest in obtaining a
jury that does not contain members who are unable to follow the law
with respect to a particular issue in a capital case.”90
87

88

89
90

Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 415 (1987). The death qualification
process itself has undergone various changes in the past several decades. In
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 (1968), the Court narrowed the pre1968 standard of removing prospective jurors for having any “conscientious
scruples” against the death penalty, holding that to allow “removal for cause
of jurors based merely on their general scruples against capital punishment”
was to deny a defendant his due process right to an impartial jury. John
D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death
Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 195, 319 n.901
(2009); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519-23; Winick, supra note 81, at 831-32.
Witherspoon thus restricted removal on this basis to venire persons who make
it “unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the
imposition of capital punishment . . ., or (2) that their attitude toward the
death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the
defendant’s guilt.” 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (emphasis added). Seventeen years
later, the Court expanded permissible removals on this basis with Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), which reinstituted some of the judge’s discretion.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986). In Lockhart, the Court
overruled the lower courts’ determination that the death qualification process
violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements of a fair-crosssection representation and jury impartiality because the process resulted
in “conviction-prone” juries. Id. at 167-73 (questioning the reliability of
petitioner’s social science evidence on the matter).
483 U.S. at 402, 415 (1987); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 23940 (1976) (holding that intentional discrimination is unconstitutional but
laws’ or policies’ racially disparate impacts are not).
Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 416.
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Although death qualification’s constitutionality has been
upheld, the process still stands to undermine juries’ ability to serve
their function fairly and indiscriminately. Valerie Hans and Alayna
Jehle observe that exclusions based on death penalty attitudes
“may have a deleterious impact on the representativeness and
impartiality of the capital jury.”91 In one example, researchers in a
California study of 1,275 community residents found that the “jury
qualification requirements tend[ed] to disrupt the representative
composition of the general population,” skewing the composition
towards white men.92 Others have also noted that women and black
prospective jurors are more likely to be removed during voir dire for
their opposition to capital punishment.93
3. Peremptory Strikes
After voir dire, the parties may choose to exercise a number
of peremptory strikes, also known as peremptory challenges, which
are vetoes that parties may use against individual jurors without
stating a reason for the veto.94 In South Carolina, defendants charged
with serious crimes are allowed ten strikes and the state is allowed
five.95 Peremptory strikes are controversial: no constitutional right
protects their use, and while some consider them to be essential to
the jury system,96 others forcefully advocate their elimination.97 One
commentator called peremptory challenges “the last best tool of
Jim Crow.”98
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

98

Hans & Jehle, supra note 7, at 1181.
Fukurai, supra note 52, at 151, 162, 165-66.
Jill M. Cochran, Note, Courting Death: 30 Years Since Furman, Is the Death
Penalty Any Less Discriminatory? Looking at the Problem of Jury Discretion in Capital
Sentencing, 38 Val. U. L. Rev. 1399, 1444 (2004).
Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 447 (1996).
S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1110 (1976).
Melilli, supra note 94.
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266-67 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting
that when Batson was decided, Justice Thurgood Marshall predicted that the
decision would not achieve its goal, and opining that Miller-El reinforced the
reality that “[t]he only way to ‘end the racial discrimination that peremptories
inject into the jury-selection process’ . . . [is] to ‘eliminat[e] peremptory
challenges entirely.’”) (third alteration in original).
Mary Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination?
Some Data from One County, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 695, 696 (1999) (internal
citation omitted).
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Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny prohibited peremptory
strikes motivated by prospective jurors’ race or gender, holding
that they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.99 The Batson test now requires a party seeking to
challenge a strike to establish a prima facie case that his or her
opponent exercised a strike on the basis of race,100 or, per J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., gender.101 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to provide a race- or gender-neutral explanation
for the strike.102 The court then determines whether purposeful
discrimination motivated the strike.103
Although the subject of ample litigation, Batson and related
decisions are known for their lack of impact.104 This apparent
inefficacy itself is cited as a potential indication that peremptory
challenges should be eliminated altogether.105 As mentioned above,
the central weakness is the fact that, when the non-moving party
in a Batson or J.E.B. motion must provide a reason for the strike
in question other than race or gender, attorneys are easily able to
provide neutral-sounding rationales.106 “These perfunctory hearings
fail to meaningfully interrogate the reasons prosecutors offer as
99

100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992);
see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Recalcitrance: The Miller-El Remands, 5
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 131, 131 (2007). Batson overruled Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965), where the Court had held that equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment would only be violated if “the defendant could
prove that the prosecutor struck African American jurors in every case.”
Johnson, infra at 133. The decision in Swain “set the bar so high for proving
discriminatory intent that no litigant won a Swain claim for [twenty] years.”
Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 7, at 12. This means the window
for winning claims based on racial discrimination has only relatively recently
been opened. See id. Practice suggests that it has not been opened very far,
however. Some have argued that other distinctive groups, such as people with
religious beliefs, should also be protected from discriminatory peremptory
challenges. See Anthony D. Foti, Note, Could Jesus Serve on a Jury? Not in the
Third Circuit: Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges in United States v. Dejesus and
Bronshtein v. Horn, 51 Vill. L. Rev. 1057, 1057-58 (2006).
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
Id. at 98.
Fukurai, supra note 52, at 167.
Melilli, supra note 94, at 483 (noting Justice Marshall’s argument that Batson’s
goals could only be achieved by eliminating peremptory challenges).
See Rose, supra note 98, at 696.
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race neutral motivations for peremptorily striking Black jurors.”107
Consequently, defendants “monopolize the making of Batson
claims,” yet, “the success rate of such claims by criminal defendants
is manifestly unimpressive.”108 Although anecdotal, it is telling that
despite the rather blatant evidence in Foster, the pursuit of Foster’s
Batson claim took thirty years of litigation.
The role of race and gender in the exercise of peremptory
strikes has spurred discussion as tense as that surrounding the
existence of the strikes themselves. In a study of challenges based
on Batson from 1986 to 1993, Kenneth Melilli found that 87.38%
of challenges during the period challenged the striking of black
jurors.109 He argued:
Because peremptory challenges are exercised after
the challenges for cause, any prospective juror who
is peremptorily struck is presumably an individual
who is not subject to a valid challenge for cause. For
this reason . . . peremptory challenges are frequently
exercised on the basis of group affiliations rather than
individual characteristics. Indeed, evaluating people
on the basis of stereotypes is an inherent aspect of
the peremptory challenge system. The peremptory
challenge system allows lawyers and litigants to
impose these stereotypes upon the jury selection
process without articulating these potentially
offensive and divisive prejudices.110
Consistent with Melilli’s concerns, commentators continue
to observe parties’ disproportionate strikes of certain groups, with
strike rates depending on the race of the defendant.111
107
108
109
110

Price, supra note 7, at 57.
Melilli, supra note 94, at 459.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 447 (internal citations omitted). Lawyers’ motivations for exercising
peremptory challenges on the basis of race or gender are not necessarily based
solely upon derogatory stereotypes. For instance, a defense attorney may take
race into account for her choices of strikes if she feels that an attempt to comply
with Batson would force her to ignore, to her client’s detriment, her knowledge
of the statistical evidence of how jurors’ attitudes are influenced by their race.
E.g., Richard C. Dieter, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Blind Justice:
Juries Deciding Life and Death with Only Half the Truth 4
(2005), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/BlindJustice Report.pdf.
111 Hans & Jehle, supra note 7, at 1190-91; Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A
Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am.
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A repeated concern in Supreme Court jurisprudence on
discrimination in capital trials is preventing the arbitrary application
of the law, which potentially violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.112 The Court explained
in Taylor and reaffirmed in Batson that “[t]he purpose of a jury is to
guard against the exercise of arbitrary power — to make available
the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against
the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor.”113 Yet, in the 1987 decision
McCleskey v. Kemp,114 which has been called “the Dred Scott decision
of our time,”115 the Court concluded that “apparent disparities in
sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.”116
A discriminatory purpose, as opposed to a disparate impact, must be
shown to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.117 This
high burden explains, in part, the impotence of Batson.
The decision in Foster in 2016 did not appear to alter the
Batson playing field substantially. The evidence, discussed above,
prompted Justice Kagan to query during oral arguments, “Isn’t
this as clear a Batson violation as a court is ever going to see?”118
Commentators agree that the decision was limited in scope at best,
and at worst, “create[d] an artificial and impossibly high burden of
proof for future cases.”119

112
113
114
115
116
117
118

119

Crim. L. Rev. 1099, 1100, 1100 n.6 (1994); see Rose, supra note 98, at 69799 (observing that black venire members were peremptorily struck by the
prosecution in a sample that consisted primarily of black defendants).
See e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)(emphasis added); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Diann Rust-Tierney, A Personal Reflection on McCleskey v. Kemp, ACLU:
Speak Freely (Apr. 23, 2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/capitalpunishment-racial-justice/personal-reflection-mccleskey-v-kemp.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312.
Id. at 292.
Dahlia Lithwick, Peremptory Prejudice, Slate (May 23, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/john_
roberts_s_court_sees_racism_in_foster_v_chatman.html; see also Cino, supra
note 13 (noting Justice Alito’s concurrence “hint[ing] that you basically have
to have a slam dunk to win a Batson challenge. Foster’s case is a standout
from what is usually a subtler and more discreet form [sic] racial bias that
permeates and infects other cases.”).
See Cino, supra note 13.
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III. Survey of Studies Addressing Race and Gender in Capital
Punishment
Studies on racial disparities in capital sentencing emerged as
a substantial body of scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s in the wake
of Furman v. Georgia,120 which for a short time effectively abolished
capital punishment because the Court found that juries exercised
unfettered discretion and could impose death discriminatorily.121
Furman was soon followed by Gregg v. Georgia,122 which upheld state
death penalty schemes that incorporated “channeled discretion.”123
These early studies tended to focus on the race of the victim or
defendant.124 In a 1990 study using data from Georgia, David Baldus
and colleagues examined whether legal developments post-Furman
had “achieved their promise to end arbitrariness and discrimination
in death sentencing in this country.”125 The study found a strong raceof-victim effect, where “the average defendant with a white victim
faced a statistically significant 7- to 9- percentage-point higher risk
of a death sentence than did a similarly situated defendant whose
victim was black.”126 Baldus attributed this effect to prosecutorial
discretion.127 Generally, the researchers concluded that jury decisions
120 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman had no controlling opinion, but held that
arbitrariness and racial disparities in death sentencing violated the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 242, 249-51 (Douglas, J. concurring); id. at 274, 277, 29495 (Marshall, J. concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J. concurring); id. at 313
(White, J. concurring); id. at 365 (Marshall, J. concurring). Furman imposed a
de facto moratorium on the death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
168-69 (1976).
121 Chaka M. Patterson, Race and the Death Penalty: The Tension Between Individualized
Justice and Racially Neutral Standards, 2 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 45, 46 (1995).
122 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
123 Id. at 206-07. The death penalty was reinstated in South Carolina post-Furman
on July 2, 1974. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/south-carolina-1 (last visited Aug. 4, 2016).
124 See Hemant Sharma et al., Race and the Death Penalty: An Empirical Assessment
of First Degree Murder Convictions in Tennessee After Gregg v. Georgia, 2 Tenn. J.
Race, Gender, & Soc. Just. 1, 5 (2013) (discussing 1980s race-of-victim
studies); Ogletree, supra note 111 (noting 1970s race-of-defendant findings);
Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the
Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 754, 762, 783
(1983) (examining victim, defendant, and geography).
125 David C. Baldus et al., Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis 394 (1990).
126 Id. at 401.
127 Id. at 403.
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in Georgia were highly unpredictable,128 and “that the problems
with fairness and equal justice in Georgia’s death-sentencing system
[were] widespread.”129 The study established a landmark for the
examination of the role of race in the administration of capital
punishment.
Until the last fifteen years or so, most social science on race or
gender and the justice system continued to focus on questions other
than jury representativeness.130 More recent studies focused on jury
representativeness have often been experimental, i.e., conducted
in simulated scenarios.131 Few published studies have examined
the use of peremptory challenges in real trials.132 Both before and
after Batson, a variety of experimental and other laboratory studies
demonstrated the importance of race in jury selection.133
In 1999, Mary Rose aimed to fill the dearth of data on
peremptory challenges by observing trials in a North Carolina court
in order to “investigate how prosecutors and defense attorneys
use[d] . . . peremptory challenge[s] and how characteristics of
seated jury panels compare[d] to those of the venire.”134 She
observed thirteen felony criminal jury trials with a total of eighteen
defendants, seventeen of whom were black and two of whom were
women, in addition to 348 venire members questioned during voir
dire.135 Rose concluded that, although blacks and whites had the same
likelihood of being excused from the jury via peremptory challenge,
black prospective jurors had a greater likelihood of being dismissed
by the state — 71% of black prospective jurors dismissed — whereas
81% of whites dismissed were excused by the defense.136 She found
that women and men had roughly equal likelihood of being excused
through peremptory challenges, and equal likelihood of being
excused by one side or the other.137 She noted her results’ limited
generalizability, but concluded they “suggest the need for a more
informed debate about the [use of the] peremptory challenge[] . . . in
modern criminal trials.”138
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 403-04.
Id. at 409.
Rose, supra note 98, at 697.
Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1536-38.
Id. at 1538.
Id. at 1536.
Rose, supra note 98, at 697.
Id. at 697-98.
Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 695.
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In 2001, Baldus and colleagues focused specifically on
peremptory challenges in capital murder trials.139 In a study of
Philadelphia cases from the 1980s and 1990s, they concluded that
race was the predominant factor in prosecutorial use of peremptory
challenges, with gender also playing a significant role.140 Race and
gender were also significant factors for defense counsel, with the
defense particularly disfavoring men.141 The researchers found that
death-sentencing rates were “higher . . . when the prosecutorial
strike [rate against] black venire members was high.”142 By contrast,
“[t]he results indicated that a highly discriminatory defense counsel
effort against non-black venire members was associated with a five
percentage point lower overall death-sentencing rate.”143 These
findings illustrate how jury selection and the use of peremptory
challenges can shape capital trial outcomes. They also highlight
the ethical dilemmas faced by defense attorneys, where the duty of
zealous advocacy might be perceived to compel targeting white, male
jurors for removal due to their higher tendency to be conviction- and
death-prone.144
In 2010-2011, informed in part by the Baldus Philadelphia
study and several others with similar findings,145 Barbara O’Brien and
Catherine Grosso examined peremptory strikes in North Carolina by
investigating jury selection processes for the trials of all defendants
on the state’s death row as of July 1, 2010, in order to assess whether
venire members’ race had been a factor in prosecutors’ use of
peremptory challenges.146 They studied 173 proceedings with a total
of 7,421 venire members, gathering data from court documents and
jury selection transcripts.147 Their study used detailed, descriptive
information about one sample of venire members in order to control
139
140
141
142
143
144

Baldus et al., supra note 24.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 107 n.234.
Id.
See Hans & Jehle, supra note 7, at 1191 (discussing defense attorney’s belief
that “it is unethical for a defense lawyer to disregard what is known about the
influence of race and sex on juror attitudes in order to comply with Batson v.
Kentucky and its progeny.”).
145 For a summary of studies conducted by Billy Turner and colleagues in
Louisiana, John Clark and colleagues in a southeastern state, and Richard
Bourke and Joe Hingston in Louisiana, in addition to others, see Grosso &
O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1538-39.
146 O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7, at 2.
147 Id. at 2-3.
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for factors other than race that may have accounted for the decision
to strike.148
O’Brien and Grosso concluded that “[p]rosecutors exercised
peremptory challenges at a significantly higher rate against
black venire members than against all other venire members.”149
Specifically, the prosecution struck 52.6% of eligible black venire
members and 25.7% of all other eligible venire members.150 They
found this disparity to be even greater in cases where defendants
were black.151 The differences persisted when the data were adjusted
to rule out possible race-neutral causes for removals, such as
opposition to the death penalty, so that racial disparities in strike
patterns “could not be attributable to the possibility that relevant
attitudes vary along racial lines.”152
O’Brien and Grosso’s study has been central to litigation
over four North Carolina death row inmates’ sentences.153 The
North Carolina Racial Justice Act (RJA) of 2009 “explicitly
authorized the use of statistical evidence in determining whether
racial discrimination was a significant factor in death sentences.”154
Robert Mosteller explains that in State v. Robinson, the first decision
under the Act:
[T]he RJA demonstrated its potential as an
important new tool to eliminate the use of race-based
peremptory challenges. . . . [T]he trial court, relying
heavily on statistical evidence . . . ruled that race
was a significant factor in the prosecution’s use of
peremptory challenges, vacated the death sentence,
and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.155
148
149
150
151
152
153

154
155

Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12. In these cases, “the average strike rate was 60% against black venire
members and 23.1% against other venire members.” Id.
O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7, at 13.
State v. Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151, 152 (N.C. 2015); State v. Augustine, 780
S.E.2d 552 (N.C. 2015); Neil Vidmar, The North Carolina Racial Justice Act: An
Essay on Substantive and Procedural Fairness in Death Penalty Litigation, 97 Iowa L.
Rev. 1969, 1971, 1971 n.9 (2012) (discussing use of the O’Brien and Grosso
study in litigation over Robinson’s sentence and others).
Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey and Batson: The North Carolina
Racial Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory Challenges in Death Cases, 10 Ohio
St. J. Crim. L. 103, 104 (2012).
Id. at 105.
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Three additional death sentences were subsequently vacated
as well.156 However, in 2012, “a very different legislative majority
than the one that passed the RJA rewrote the law . . . [and]
significantly reduce[d] in importance but [did] not eliminate the use
of statistical evidence . . . .” 157 In 2015, the North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the vacated sentences on procedural
grounds.158 The inmates’ petition for certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court was denied in October 2016.159 The shortlived RJA may have been ineffectual in this instance, and unique in
general — South Carolina lacks any comparable law. However, this
litigation shows empirical studies’ potential for use in actual cases
to compensate for evidentiary difficulties in individual Batson claims.
Several studies have considered the role of race and gender
in South Carolina capital cases,160 although none have paralleled
O’Brien and Grosso’s study of peremptory challenges and none
have delved deeply into issues of jury representativeness. Michael
Songer and Isaac Unah examined the role of race in South Carolina
156 Campbell Robertson, Bias Law Used to Move a Man Off Death Row, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/21/us/north-carolina-lawused-to-set-aside-a-death-sentence.html?pagewanted=2&_r=3; Order Granting
Motions for Appropriate Relief, State v. Golphin, No. 97 CRS 47314-15 (Sup. Ct.
N.C. Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rja_order_12-13-12.
pdf. The inmates are Marcus Robinson, Tilmon Golphin, Christina Walters,
and Quintel Augustine. As mentioned above, North Carolina’s 2012 Racial
Justice Act (RJA) was an important factor in these vacaturs. The RJA provided
that “[n]o person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death or shall
be executed pursuant to any judgment that was sought or obtained on the
basis of race.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2010 (2009), repealed by S.L. 2013-154
§ 5(a) (June 19, 2013). In 2013, the North Carolina legislature repealed the
RJA. In 2015, the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s
decision and remanded the cases to give prosecutors more time to respond
in the “unusual and complex” case involving statistical data. Robinson, 780
S.E.2d at 152; Augustine, 780 S.E.2d 552. In May 2016, the inmates filed their
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. The
petition cites O’Brien’s and Grosso’s study. Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151, petition
for cert. (U.S. May 13, 2016) (No. 15-1397), http://www.scotusblog.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/05/15-1397-Marcus-Robinson-v-State-of-NorthCarolina-Petition-for-a-Writ-of-Certiorari.pdf.
157 Mosteller, supra note 154, at 105-06.
158 Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151 at 151-52.
159 Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151, cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 67 (2016) (mem.).
160 E.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence
in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 306 (2003); Michael J.
Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial
Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 161 (2006).
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prosecutorial decisions to seek the death penalty in their study, The
Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the
Death Penalty in South Carolina.161 They concluded:
Legally impermissible . . . victim and defendant
characteristics . . . affect capital case selection. . . .
Perhaps most distressingly, the study confirms that
insidious racial disparities still haunt South Carolina’s
death penalty system. South Carolina prosecutors are
[three] times more likely to seek the death penalty in
white victim cases than in black victim cases.162
As to death qualification, the practice of removing jurors who
oppose the death penalty in capital cases has been widely criticized
as resulting in biased and unrepresentative juries, as discussed
above.163 Scholars have observed in particular the process’s disparate
impact on potential women and African American jurors.164 Robert
Fitzgerald and Phoebe Ellsworth, among the first to study the
issue in the early 1980s, found that death-qualified jurors were not
representative of the general population. Rather, they found that
approximately 15% of whites were excluded compared to 25%
of blacks, and that capital juries were more biased towards the
prosecution and a guilty verdict.165 The Capital Jury Project recently
produced similar findings, concluding that certain distinctive groups
(including racial minorities, women, and Catholics) were less likely
to be able to serve on capital juries and that death-qualified juries
were more likely to convict and impose a death sentence.166
IV. South Carolina Data
This study attempts to build upon projects such as O’Brien
161
162
163
164
165

Songer & Unah, supra note 160.
Id. at 205-06.
See Lynch & Haney, supra note 26; Winick, supra note 81.
E.g., Lynch & Haney, supra note 26.
Death Qualification, Capital Punishment in Context, http://www.
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/deathqualification (last visited
Aug. 4, 2016); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime
Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 Law & Hum. Behav. 31, 46
(1984) (concluding that death-qualified juries are more likely to exclude
women and African American men).
166 Death Qualification, supra note 165.
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and Grosso’s by investigating whether race and gender interacted
with the likelihood and manner of prospective jurors’ removal from
a set of cases resulting in death sentences in South Carolina from
1997 to 2012. The inquiry here is focused additionally on whether
removal for opposition to the death penalty had a disparate impact
on women and black venire members.167
A. Methodology
One coding instrument was used to enter all data on
prospective jurors’ characteristics and manner of removal, which were
determined almost entirely from transcripts of voir dire questioning.
Trial transcripts were acquired from the Office of Appellate Defense,
a division of the South Carolina Office of Indigent Defense. The
gender of potential jurors tended to be apparent from their names or
the judges’ or attorneys’ use of the terms, “sir,” “ma’am,” “Mr.,” or
“Ms.” Potential jurors’ race was discernible only where transcripts
explicitly stated such information (for instance, by indicating, “Juror
33, a White Female, entered the room.”).
Because data on potential jurors’ gender was more easily
discernible, the set of workable trial transcripts was smaller for
examining race than it was for gender. Thus, the analysis of gender
as a factor in removal was based on thirty-five trials from the period
of 1997 to 2012 that resulted in death sentences,168 including
167 For an overview of capital punishment jurisprudence and statistics in South
Carolina, see John H. Blume & Lindsey S. Vann, Forty Years of Death: the Past,
Present, and Future of the Death Penalty in South Carolina (Still Arbitrary After All
These Years), 11 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 183 (2016).
168 State v. Aleksey, 538 S.E.2d 248 (S.C. 2000) aff ’g State v. Aleksey, No.
E784245 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Sept. 1, 1998); State v. Barnes, 753 S.E.2d 546
(S.C. 2013) rev’g State v. Barnes, No. H870420 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Jan. 6,
2011); State v. Binney, 608 S.E.2d 418 (S.C. 2005) aff ’g State v. Binney, No.
F981513 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Nov. 14, 2002); State v. Bixby, 698 S.E.2d 572
(S.C. 2010) aff ’g State v. Bixby, Nos. 2004GS0100321A, 2004GS0100321C
(S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 21, 2007); State v. Bryant, 642 S.E.2d 582 (S.C.
2007) aff ’g State v. Bryant, No. G515142 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Oct. 9, 2004);
State v. Burkhart, 640 S.E.2d 450 (S.C. 2007) rev’g in part State v. Burkhart,
Nos. E698460-62 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Mar. 2004); State v. Cottrell, 657 S.E.2d
451 (S.C. 2008) rev’g State v. Cottrell, No. I265178 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Apr.
6, 2005); State v. Evans, 637 S.E.2d 313 (S.C. 2006) aff ’g State v. Evans, No.
H359051-52 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Sept. 22, 2004); State v. Evins, 645 S.E.2d
904 (S.C. 2007) aff ’g State v. Evins, No. 2003GS4202533A (S.C. Ct. Gen.
Sess. Nov. 19, 2004); State v. Finklea, 697 S.E.2d 543 (S.C. 2010) aff ’g State
v. Finklea, No. G501546 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Sept. 6, 2007); State v. Haselden,
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observations for 3,031 venire members. The analysis of race as a
factor was based on a subset of 23 cases that had data for venire
members’ race available among those 35 (including 19 with data on
venire members’ race at the voir dire and peremptory strike stages
577 S.E.2d 445 (S.C. 2003) rev’g in part State v. Haselden, No. F851854 (S.C.
Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 10, 2001); State v. Hill, 604 S.E.2d 696 (S.C. 2009) aff ’g
in part State v. Hill, No. F185132 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 8, 2000); State v.
Jones, 681 S.E.2d 580 (S.C. 2009) rev’g State v. Jones, No. E640538 (S.C. Ct.
Gen. Sess. Mar. 14, 2007); State v. Kelly, 502 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1998) aff ’g State
v. Kelly, No. D931318 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Aug. 14, 1995); State v. Laney,
627 S.E.2d 726 (S.C. 2006) rev’g State v. Laney, No. G099682 (S.C. Ct. Gen.
Sess. Oct. 19, 2001); State v. Lindsey, 642 S.E.2d 557 (S.C. 2007) aff ’g State
v. Lindsey, No. H252531 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. May 24, 2004); State v. Locklair,
535 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 2000) aff ’g State v. Locklair, No. E231434 (S.C. Ct. Gen.
Sess. Sept. 22, 1998); State v. Mercer, 672 S.E.2d 556 (S.C. 2009) aff ’g State
v. Mercer, No. H128342 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Apr. 22, 2006); State v. Morgan,
626 S.E.2d 888 (S.C. 2006) vacating State v. Morgan, No. G487949 (S.C. Ct.
Gen. Sess. Mar. 9, 2004); State v. Motts, 707 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. 2011) aff ’g State
v. Motts, No. I359760 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Dec. 2, 2007); State v. Owens,
664 S.E.2d 80 (S.C. 2008) aff ’g State v. Owens, No. E658835 (S.C. Ct. Gen.
Sess. Feb. 14, 2003); State v. Quattlebaum, 527 S.E.2d 105 (S.C. 2000) rev’g
State v. Quattlebaum, No. E499159 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Mar. 4, 1998); State
v. Rivera, No. 2011-UP-138, 2011 WL 11733625 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) aff ’g
State v. Rivera, No. I715656 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 13, 2008); State v. Sapp,
621 S.E.2d 883 (S.C. 2005) aff ’g State v. Sapp, No. G040321 (S.C. Ct. Gen.
Sess. May 19, 2003); State v. Sigmon, 623 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 2005) aff ’g State
v. Sigmon, No. G556370 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. July 18, 2002); State v. Stanko,
741 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. 2013) aff ’g State v. Stanko, No. I742833 (S.C. Ct. Gen.
Sess. Nov. 19, 2009); State v. Starnes, 531 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 2000) (“Starnes I”)
rev’g State v. Starnes, No. E682636 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Apr. 25, 1997); State
v. Starnes, 698 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 2010) (“Starnes II”) aff ’g State v. Starnes,
No. E682636 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Nov. 17, 2007); State v. Tench, 579 S.E.2d
314 (S.C. 2003) aff ’g State v. Tench, No. F862590 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. May 8,
2000); State v. Vazquez, 613 S.E.2d 359 (S.C. 2005) aff ’g State v. Vazquez, No.
2002GS2602786B (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Oct. 5, 2003); State v. Weik, 587 S.E.2d
683 (S.C. 2002) aff ’g State v. Weik, No. E091046 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. May 29,
1999); State v. Williams, 690 S.E.2d 62 (S.C. 2010) aff ’g State v. Williams,
No. H360518 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 19, 2005); State v. Winkler, 698 S.E.2d
596 (S.C. 2010) aff ’g State v. Winkler, No. I252573 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb.
8, 2008); State v. Wise, 596 S.E.2d 475 (S.C. 2001) aff ’g State v. Wise, Nos.
F034429-31, F497161 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 1, 2001); State v. Woods, 676
S.E.2d 128 (S.C. 2009) aff ’g State v. Woods, No. H055517 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess.
Dec. 8, 2006).
Of these thirty-five cases, nineteen cases had information concerning race,
gender, voir dire, and peremptory strikes; twelve cases in addition to those had
information on gender, voir dire, and strikes; and four cases had information
on gender and voir dire only.
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and four with data on venire members’ race during voir dire only),169
including observations for 1,088 venire members. These cases were
selected based on availability to the author, and it is hoped that more
data can be entered for this project.
The research presented here thus has several limitations.
First, it is neither a simple random sample of South Carolina capital
punishment cases, nor inclusive of all cases for a given period.
Records on file with the author indicate that between 1997 and 2012,
the state of South Carolina imposed 63 death sentences using juries,
including five re-sentencings of repeat defendants. The conclusions
here must therefore be taken with a grain of salt: they are limited in
their generalizability, and future research with more comprehensive
data may help confirm or refute these findings. Further, because
this set of trials resulted in death sentences, juror characteristics or
pre-trial procedures may already have been skewed toward death.
The data are therefore less representative than a sample including
jurors who had acquitted or chosen life sentences. The statistical
analysis here also provides only summaries and correlations and
does not control for factors other than race and gender, such as prior
convictions or strike eligibility,170 which may have contributed to the
results. Observations made for race may be less generalizable than
observations made for gender due to the smaller sample size.
Nevertheless, the findings presented here are not trivial.
Several characteristics of the data suggest elements of normalcy to
these trials, including that (1) the rates of excusals for cause in this
study also reflect the rates of excusals for cause in other studies;171
169 Aleksey, 538 S.E.2d 248; Barnes, 753 S.E.2d 546; Binney, 608 S.E.2d 418;
Bryant, 642 S.E.2d 582; Burkhart, 640 S.E.2d 450; Evins, 645 S.E.2d 904;
Finklea, 697 S.E.2d 543; Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 445; Hill, 604 S.E.2d 696;
Jones, 681 S.E.2d 580; Kelly, 502 S.E.2d 99; Laney, 627 S.E.2d 726; Locklair,
535 S.E.2d 420; Mercer, 672 S.E.2d 556; Quattlebaum, 527 S.E.2d 105; Sapp,
621 S.E.2d 883; Sigmon, 623 S.E.2d 648; Stanko, 658 S.E.2d 94; Starnes I,
531 S.E.2d 907; Vasquez, 613 S.E.2d 359; Williams, 690 S.E.2d 62; Wise,
596 S.E.2d 475; Woods, 382 S.C. 153, 676 S.E.2d 128. Four among the cases
with race information available had data for voir dire only and not peremptory
strikes. Thus, the case set for race and peremptory strikes included 19 cases.
The case set for race and voir dire included 23 cases.
170 See O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7, at 4 (“‘Strike eligibility’ refers to
which party or parties had the chance to exercise a peremptory strike against
a particular venire member. For instance, if the prosecution struck someone
before the defense had a chance to question that person, that juror would be
strike eligible to the prosecution only.”).
171 Cf. tbl.1; Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size
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(2) the juries in these cases were selected from venire pools that
were relatively representative of their counties in cases for which
that information was available (see Table 1 below); and (3) the
findings here are consistent with findings in previous studies. This
analysis thus provides meaningful insight into how race and gender
interact with South Carolina capital jury selection processes, and,
potentially, elsewhere.
B. Empirical Findings
1.

Venire Representativeness

TABLE 1:
Comparison of Black/White Composition in Venires and Trial Counties
Case

Venire %
County %
Venire
Black/White172 Black/White173 Representative?174

Statistically
Significant?

Anthony 47% Black
Woods 53% White

52% Black
48% White
(Clarendon)

YES
NO (p = .57,
[(Absolute disparity 2-tail Fisher
5%) divided by (52% exact)
population) = 1%
less than expected]

Charles 17% Black
Williams 83% White

20% Black
80% White
(Greenville)

MAYBE
NO (p = .72,
[(Absolute disparity 2-tail Fisher
3%) divided by (20% exact)
population) = 15%
less than expected]

James
Bryant

14% Black
86% White
(Horry)

YES
NO (p > .99,
[(Absolute disparity 2-tail Fisher
1%) divided by (14% exact)
population) = 1%
less than expected]

13% Black
87% White

and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 425, 436 (2009).
172 Calculated based on trial transcripts from which this data could be reasonably
discerned.
173 Community demographics were calculated using government census data
and excluded residents who were neither white nor black. See United States
Census 2010, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/2010census/
(follow “Population Finder” hyperlink by selecting “South Carolina; then
follow “Areas Within” hyperlink after selecting “South Carolina”; then follow
“Search” hyperlink after selecting “Counties / Municipios”; then follow “Areas
Within” after selecting the desired county) (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
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TABLE 1:
Comparison of Black/White Composition in Venires and Trial Counties
Case

Venire %
County %
Venire
Black/White172 Black/White173 Representative?174

Statistically
Significant?

Jonathan 32% Black
Binney 68% White

21% Black
79% White
(Cherokee)

MAYBE (under-repNO (p = .11,
resents Whites)
2-tail Fisher
[(Absolute disparity exact)
11%) divided by (79%
population) = 14%
less than expected]

Kevin
Mercer

6% Black
94% White

15% Black
85% White
(Lexington)

NO
NO (p = .06,
[(Absolute disparity 2-tail Fisher
9%) divided by (15% exact)
population) = 60%
less than expected]

Ron
Finklea

8% Black
92% White

15% Black
85% White
(Lexington)

NO
NO (p = .18,
[(Absolute disparity 2-tail Fisher
7%) divided by (15% exact)
population) = 47%
less than expected]

Jeffrey
Jones

7% Black
93% White

15% Black
85% White
(Lexington)

NO
NO (p = .11,
[(Absolute disparity 2-tail Fisher
8%) divided by (15% exact)
population) = 53%
less than expected]

174 Determined using the comparative disparity test articulated in Duren
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), and Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314,
327 (2010). The test has three prongs for showing a violation of Taylor’s
requirement that venires be drawn from a fair-cross section of the community:
“(1) the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group . . .; (2) the
group’s representation in the jury pool is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such persons in the population; and (3) the underrepresentation of the group results from systematic exclusion of the group
in the jury selection process.” Jury Managers’ Toolbox: A Primer on Fair Cross
Section Jurisprudence, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts. (2010), http://www.ncscjurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/What%20We%20Do/A%20
Primer%20on%20Fair%20Cross%20Section.ashx. The second prong is
based solely on those eligible for jury service who are also available. Id. at 3.
“Absolute disparity describes the proportional difference in the representation
of the distinctive group . . . . Comparative disparity measures the percentage
by which the number of distinctive group members in the jury pool falls short
of their number in the community.” Id. To calculate comparative disparity,
divide the absolute disparity percentage by the percentage of the jury-eligible
population, to indicate the percentage less of the group that is present than
would normally be expected. Id.
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Table 1 represents the racial composition of the venires of
seven cases for which the data were available, juxtaposed alongside
the composition of the counties where the trials took place. For
instance, the first row and second column show that the trial of
Anthony Woods involved a venire comprised of 47% black prospective
jurors and 53% white prospective jurors. The third column provides
the racial composition of Clarendon County (52% black and 48%
white), where Woods’ trial took place. The column entitled “Venire
Representativeness” indicates the determination that, according to
the Supreme Court’s “comparative disparity” test, Woods’ venire
pool represented a fair cross-section of the community in terms of
its racial composition. The final column includes the conclusion as
to whether any difference between the county and the venire was
statistically significant, which shows that even where a venire might
fail the doctrinal test for representativeness, the venire may not be
unrepresentative according to other measures.
The data in Table 1 establish a general idea of how
representative the venire pools were in these seven cases, providing
some context for the significance of the subsequent selection
procedures (i.e., knowing if there were zero black venire members
represented at the beginning might theoretically help explain low
strike rates of black prospective jurors). One weakness is that the
comparative disparity test is meant to be calculated based on the
available, jury-eligible element of the population,175 which Table 1
does not include. The information presented in Table 1 should thus
be treated as an approximation.
Based on this approximation, Clarendon, Greenville, Horry,
and Cherokee Counties appear to have provided adequately racially
representative venire pools for the respective trials held there,
with Cherokee County the only one under-representing whites.
The “maybes” account for the fact that the Supreme Court has not
embraced a bright-line rule of what it means to pass the various fair
cross-section tests.176 Lexington was the only county that appeared
to underrepresent blacks in its venire pools. Although the disparity
was not statistically significant, the Mercer, Finklea, and Jones trials
would clearly fail the comparative disparity test.

175 Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 328-29 (2010).
176 Id. at 329-30, 330 n.5.
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2. Men versus Women in Set of 35 Cases, 1997-2012
a. Status throughout Entire Selection Process

TABLE 2:
Summary of All Removals, by Gender†
Men

Women

Row Total

Did Not Reach
Voir Dire

167 Individuals
(11% of men)

171 Individuals
(11% of women)

338 Individuals
(11%)

Excused for
Cause

819 Individuals
(53%)

800 Individuals
(53%)

1,619 Individuals
(53%)

Struck

243 Individuals
(16%)

216 Individuals
(14%)

459 Individuals
(15%)

Qualified, Not
Reached for
Strikes

84 Individuals
(5%)

91 Individuals
(6%)

175 Individuals
(6%)

Seated on Jury

187 Individuals
(12%)

182 Individuals
(12%)

369 Individuals
(12%)

Alternate

33 Individuals
(2%)

38 Individuals
(3%)

71 Individuals
(2%)

Column Total

1,533 Individuals

1,498 Individuals

3,031 Individuals
(100%)

χ2 (5, N = 3,031) = 2.155, p = 0.8274. P-values were calculated using the tools
at www.openepi.com with the confidence level set at 99.99%.

†

The results shown in Table 2 compare the means by which
the men and women among the 3,031 venire members observed
were removed during pre-trial procedures, if at all. For example,
the first row shows that 167 male venire members were brought
to court without reaching voir dire questioning because the court
had filled its requirements for qualified jurors from whom to select
the jury. These 167 men constituted 11% of all male jurors who
went through the selection process. Similarly, 171 women, or 11%
of all female venire members, were brought to court and sent away
without questioning.177
177 This number and proportion are likely substantially higher. However, trial
transcripts reported this information inconsistently. Some involved a mass
questioning pre-voir dire, where many jurors of an indeterminate number
were turned away because of age, prior convictions, hardship, and other
statutory bases for excuse from jury service. Other transcripts reported a
list of jurors who did not reach voir dire questioning. Thus, the first row of
this table should be viewed as a placeholder, with the actual proportion not
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The data show no significant difference between men and
women at any stage (p = .8274, χ2). A total of 1,533 men and 1,498
women went through the jury selection process, and roughly the
same percentages of each were excused without being questioned
(11%), excused for cause (53%), and qualified without being reached
for peremptory challenges (5-6%). Rates of 14-16% of each gender
were struck by parties, 12% of each gender were seated on a jury,
and 2-3% of each gender served as alternates.
b. Removals for Cause Based on Pro- or Anti-Death
Stance
TABLE 3:
Removals for Views on Death, by Gender†
Pro-Death Removal

Anti-Death Removal

Row Total

Women

54 Individuals
(21% of women
removed for views on
death penalty)
(30% of pro-death
removals)

205 Individuals
(79% of women
removed for views on
death penalty)
(58% of anti-death
removals)

259 Individuals
(100%)

Men

125 Individuals
(46% of men removed
for views on death
penalty)
(70% of pro-death
removals)

149 Individuals
(54% of men
removed for views on
death penalty)
(42% of anti-death
removals)

274 Individuals
(100%)

Column
Total

179 Individuals
(34% of death viewbased removals)

354 Individuals
(66% of death viewbased removals)

533 Individuals
(100%)

†

2-tail Fisher exact, p < .001.

The data in Table 3 indicate who the court removed, among
men and women, for expressing views too pro- or anti-capital
punishment (jurors who were removed for other reasons, such
as medical excuses and financial hardship, were omitted from the
data set for this analysis). For instance, the first cell in the first row
shows that 54 women were removed for indicating that they would
automatically apply the death penalty if the defendant were found
guilty of murder. The next cell to the right shows that 205 women
were removed for indicating that they would be unable to impose
particularly significant to the issues being discussed here.
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the death penalty. Both cells show that, of women removed for their
views on capital punishment, 21% were removed for favoring the
death penalty too strongly, while 79% were removed for opposing
the death penalty.
The difference between men and women in Table 3 is
significant at the .001 level using a 2-tail Fisher exact test. Men
were removed more than women for favoring the death penalty too
strongly (constituting 70% of pro-death removals), whereas women
were removed more than men for opposing the death penalty too
strongly (constituting 58% of anti-death removals). However,
like women, a majority of men removed for their views on death
sentencing were removed for opposition (54% of men removed for
death views) rather than for their pro-death views (46%).
c. Peremptory Strikes: Defense and Prosecution
Impacts According to Gender
TABLE 4:
Proportion of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes, by Gender†
Men

Women

Row Total

Defense
Strikes

192 Individuals
(59 % of D Strikes)

134 Individuals
(41% of D Strikes)

326 Individuals

Prosecution
Strikes

67 Individuals
96 Individuals
(41% of State Strikes) (59% of State Strikes)

163 Individuals

Column
Total

259
230
(49% of Total Strikes) (51% of Total Strikes)

489 Individuals

†

2-tail Fisher exact, p = 0.0002909

The data in Table 4 indicate prosecutor and defense use of
peremptory strikes broken down by gender. The first row shows that
the defense struck 192 men and 134 women, and that the defense
thus used 59% of its strikes on men and 41% of its strikes on
women. The next row down indicates that the prosecution struck
67 men and 96 women (with the lower numbers resulting from the
prosecution having half as many strikes as the defense), using 41%
of its strikes on men and 59% of its strikes on women.
The differences between the strikes used on each gender
shown in Table 4 are significant at the .001 level using a 2-tail Fisher
exact test. Namely, the defense struck men at a higher rate while the
prosecution struck women at a higher rate. However, the comparable
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rates resulted in roughly equal proportions of each gender being
struck overall.
3. Whites versus Blacks in Subset of 23 Cases, 1997-2012
a. Status Throughout the Entire Selection Process178
TABLE 5:
Summary of Removals/Placements throughout Selection Process, by Race†
Whites

Blacks

Row Total

Excused for Cause

284 Individuals
(33% of whites
removed)

130 Individuals
(56% of blacks
removed)

414 Individuals
(38% of removals)

Struck

268 Individuals
(31%)

39 Individuals
(16%)

305 Individuals
(28%)

Qualified, Not
Reached for Strikes

57 Individuals
(7%)

18 Individuals
(8%)

75 Individuals
(7%)

Seated on Jury

204 Individuals
(24%)

40 Individuals
(17%)

244 Individuals
(22%)

Alternate

42 Individuals
(5%)

8 Individuals
(3%)

50 Individuals
(5%)

Column Total

854 Individuals

234 Individuals

1,088 Individuals

χ (4, N = 1,088) = 43.75, p < .001. Data for individuals who arrived at the
courthouse but did not reach voir dire were removed because of inconsistency
among the transcripts and the lack of race data available at that stage.

†

2

The data in Table 5 indicate the manners in which whites
and blacks among the 1,088 assessed were removed during pre-trial
procedures, if at all. For example, the first cell in the first row shows
that 284 whites were excused for cause, or roughly 33% of all white
potential jurors. The next cell shows that 130 black potential jurors
were excused for cause, constituting approximately 56% of black
venire members.
The differences illustrated in Table 5 are significant at the
.001 level with a chi square test. Blacks were excused for cause at
a higher rate than their white counterparts. The overall percentage
of blacks struck by peremptory challenge was lower than the overall
percentage of whites struck, although this result is discussed in
greater detail in Section IV.C in light of the need to account for the
178 A very small number of venire members were neither white nor black, and
they were removed from the data set in order to simplify the analysis.
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high rate of for-cause removals of blacks. Blacks were seated on
juries at a lower rate than white venire members, at 17% and 24% of
the respective venire groups.
b. Removals for Cause Based on Pro- or Anti-Death
Views
TABLE 6:
Removals for Views on Death, by Race†
Pro-Death Removal

Anti-Death Removal

Row Total

Blacks

2 Individuals
(3% of blacks removed
for views on death
penalty)
(3% of pro-death
removals)

75 Individuals
(97% of blacks removed
for views on death
penalty)
(51% of anti-death
removals)

77 Individuals

Whites

63 Individuals
(47% of whites removed
for views on death
penalty)
(97% of pro-death
removals)

72 Individuals
(53% of whites removed
for views on death
penalty)
(49% of anti-death
removals)

135 Individuals

Column
Total

65 Individuals
(31% of removals based
on views on death
penalty)

147 Individuals
(69% of removals based
on views on death
penalty)

212 Individuals

†

2-tail Fisher exact, p < .001.

The data in Table 6 show the percentages of blacks and
whites who were removed for being either pro- or anti-death among
those jurors removed for their views on the death penalty (as with
gender, jurors who were removed for other reasons, such as medical
excuses and financial hardship, were omitted from the data set for
this analysis). For instance, the first cell in the first row shows that
two African Americans were removed for cause because of their
indication that they would automatically impose the death penalty
if the defendant were found guilty. These two individuals were three
percent of those black prospective jurors removed for their views on
death. The next cell to the right shows that 75 blacks were removed
for being unable to impose the death penalty, or 97% of black
prospective jurors removed for their views on capital punishment.
The differences presented in Table 6 are statistically
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significant at the .001 level with a 2-tail Fisher exact test. White
venire members were removed at a much higher rate than their
black counterparts for favoring the death penalty too strongly to
sit as impartial members of the jury. More whites were excused for
favoring the death penalty than for opposing it. By contrast, the
vast majority of blacks who were excused for their views on death
were excused for opposing capital punishment. Blacks constituted a
disproportionately high percentage (75 of 147 individuals, or 51%)
of prospective jurors removed for anti-death views.
c. Peremptory Strikes: Defense and Prosecution
Impacts According to Race
TABLE 7:
Percentage of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes, by Race†
Whites

Blacks

Row Total

Defense
Strikes

200 Individuals
(99% of D Strikes)

3 Individuals
(1% of D Strikes)

203 Individuals

Prosecution
Strikes

68 Individuals
36 Individuals
(65% of State Strikes) (35% of State Strikes)

104 Individuals

Column
Total

268 Individuals
39 Individuals
(87% of Total Strikes) (13% of Total Strikes)

307 Individuals

†

2-tail Fisher exact, p < .001.

The data in Table 7 illustrate defense and prosecutorial
peremptory strikes broken down by race. The first row and first
column show, for instance, that the defense used 200 of its strikes
on white individuals, or 99% of its peremptory strikes exercised. The
next column shows that the defense struck three black individuals,
constituting one percent of its total strikes. The differences in Table
7 are significant at the .001 level with a 2-tail Fisher exact test.
While the defense struck virtually no black prospective jurors, the
prosecution used 65% of its strikes on whites and 35% of its strikes
on blacks.
Blume and Vann have observed that Lexington and Horry
Counties in South Carolina have dramatically higher death sentencing
rates than other counties.179 A death sentence that was vacated in
179 Blume & Vann, supra note 167, at 205-06. Five of the cases used to analyze
race in this study were from Lexington County. See State v. Finklea, 697 S.E.2d
543 (S.C. 2010); State v. Jones, 681 S.E.2d 580 (S.C. 2009); State v. Kelly,
502 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1998); State v. Quattlebaum, 527 S.E.2d 105 (S.C. 2000);
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2016 for various racial bias issues came from Lexington County and
prosecutor Donald Myers, who has been nicknamed “Death Penalty
Donnie” for his aggressive pursuit of the death penalty.180 Thus, the
table below shows peremptory strike patterns based on race with
Lexington and Horry removed in case they skewed the data in Table 7.
TABLE 7.1:
Percentage of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes by Race with Lexington and
Horry Counties Removed†
Whites

Blacks

Row Total

Defense
Strikes

115 Individuals
(97% of D Strikes)

3 Individuals
(3% of D Strikes)

118 Individuals

Prosecution
Strikes

33 Individuals
26 Individuals
(56% of State Strikes) (44% of State Strikes)

59 Individuals

Column
Total

148 Individuals
29 Individuals
(84% of Total Strikes) (16% of Total Strikes)

177 Individuals

†

2-tail Fisher exact, p < .001.

Table 7.1 shows that the differences in the parties’ use of
strikes remained at the same proportions and statistically significant
at the .001 level, even with the removal of the two notable counties.
To illustrate the relationship between the peremptory strike
stage and the overall empanelment process, Table 8 combines the
data in Table 7 with the overall race data found in Table 5.
TABLE 8:
Summary of Removals/Placements throughout Selection Process by Race, with
Parties’ Use of Peremptory Strikes†
Whites

Blacks

Row Total

Excused for Cause

284 Individuals

130 Individuals

414 Individuals

Remaining after
Voir Dire

570 Individuals

104 Individuals

674 Individuals

Total Struck

268 Individuals

39 Individuals

305 Individuals

Starnes I, 531 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 2000); Blume & Vann, supra note 167, at 22930. Donald Myers was prosecutor for all of them. Three of the cases were from
Horry County. See State v. Bryant, 642 S.E.2d 582 (S.C. 2007); State v. Stanko,
741 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. 2013); State v. Vasquez, 613 S.E.2d 359 (S.C. 2005);
Blume & Vann, supra note 168, at 230.
180 John Monk, Avenging Angel? A look at 5 of Donnie Myers’ more memorable death
penalty cases, The State (Mar. 19, 2016), http://www.thestate.com/
news/local/article67122927.html.
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TABLE 8:
Summary of Removals/Placements throughout Selection Process by Race, with
Parties’ Use of Peremptory Strikes†
Whites

Blacks

Row Total

Struck by Prosecution

68 Individuals

36 Individuals

104 Individuals

Struck by Defense

200 Individuals

3 Individuals

203 Individuals

Percentage of Post-Voir
Dire Eligible Venire
Members Struck by
Prosecution

68/570 = 12%

36/104 = 35%

Percentage of Post-Voir
Dire Eligible Venire
Members Struck by
Defense

200/570 = 35%

3/104 = 3%

† 2
χ (4, N = 114.5) p < .001 (calculated first five rows and first two columns of
chart).

Table 8 combines data from Tables 5 and 7 to illustrate that
the prosecution’s strikes accounted for eliminating 12% of whites
who were qualified during voir dire and 35% of blacks who were
qualified. It shows that the defense’s strikes eliminated 35% of
whites who were not removed during voir dire and three percent of
blacks. The differences are statistically significant at the .001 level.
V. Discussion of Results
A. Venire Stage and Lexington County
In light of the discussion of Taylor’s questionable
implementation in practice, the mixed data in Table 1 show
surprisingly successful jury pool representativeness. However, given
the differences among counties, the results suggest ample room for
variability according to locale.181 Each of the three Lexington County
trial venires, for instance, underrepresented blacks according to
the approximation of the comparative disparity test. As mentioned
above, Lexington County also stands out because of its high rates
of death sentencing — “approximately five times greater [than] the
national average and seven times [greater than] the South Carolina
average.”182 Although far from conclusive, it would seem reasonable
181 John H. Blume, supra note 28, at 305.
182 Id. at 305 n.121.
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to infer that Lexington County’s issues with representativeness are
not unrelated to its high death sentencing rates.
B. Findings on Gender: Voir Dire and Peremptory Strikes
A comparison of Table 2 (Summary of All Removals According
to Gender) with Table 3 (Removals for Views on Death by Gender)
and Table 4 (Proportion of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes
by Gender) illuminates the influence of gender in the jury selection
processes studied. A superficial assessment of men’s and women’s
removals, shown in Table 2, suggests that men and women were
treated equally during the selection process because their outcomes
are virtually the same (p = 0.8274, χ2). For instance, men and
women were excused for cause at the same rate (both 53%), struck
at around the same rate (16% and 14%, respectively), and seated on
the jury at the same rate (12% each).
Yet, Tables 3 and 4 show that Table 2’s summary does not
tell the whole story. Rather, Table 3 (p < .001, 2-tail Fisher exact)
shows that men and women were treated differently by the court,
while Table 4 (p = 0.0002909, 2-tail Fisher exact), shows that men
and women were treated differently by the parties. Specifically,
Table 3 shows that more men than women were removed for their
excessive support for the death penalty, whereas more women than
men were removed for their inability to impose death. The data in
Table 4 indicate that the defense exercised peremptory strikes on
significantly more men than women (59% of defense strikes), and
that the prosecution exercised peremptory strikes on significantly
more women than men (59% of prosecution strikes).
Interestingly, echoing similar findings by others such as Mary
Rose (in the context of race), the opposing parties’ disproportionate
use of peremptory strikes according to gender “cancelled each other
out.”183 Namely, the defense used 41% of its strikes on women and
59% of its strikes on men whereas the prosecution used 59% of its
strikes on women and 41% of its strikes on men, a difference which
is statistically significant (p < 0.0002909, 2-tail Fisher exact) —
suggesting that gender may have been a factor in strike choices. It is
possible that controlling for gender-neutral bases for strikes would
eliminate this disparity. However, this finding is consistent with

183 Cf. Rose, supra note 98, at 698, 700; Diamond et al., supra note 171, at 425.
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prior conclusions, such as in Baldus’s Philadelphia study,184 that
gender was a factor in parties’ choices of whom to strike.
The same “cancelling out” effect occurred with excuses for
cause: because women tended to oppose death and men favored
it more, they were removed during voir dire in roughly equivalent
numbers. But do the equal numbers in removals in the end justify
the means? It may appear that the extreme ends of the spectrum on
death views are innocuously correlated with gender: men, on one
end, are shaved off for favoring death too strongly, whereas women,
on the other end, are shaved off for opposing death, resulting in a
jury pool in the middle with equal representation of the genders. It
is possible that such a “middle of the road” jury was the result here;
since women and men ended up seated on juries in equal numbers,
the juries at least appear representative. However, the deathqualification process is known to skew the jury pool toward a proprosecution bias.185 Although the genders were equally represented,
it is unclear whether conviction-proneness and pro-death biases also
evened out.
In any case, the disparate impact on women as 58% of antideath removals reflects the concerns raised above about death
qualification’s disproportionate effects on some groups over others.
In light of this impact’s potential to affect jury impartiality and
representativeness, and the jury’s supposed protective functions,
this effect on women should be of concern, notwithstanding the
even gender outcomes.
C. Findings on Race: Voir Dire and Peremptory Strikes
The findings on race are consistent with previous studies’
conclusions. Race as a factor in venire members’ removals in the
23-case subset observed revealed strong statistically significant
differences at both the voir dire stage and in parties’ use of peremptory
strikes. Although removal for opposition to the death penalty is
nominally a race-neutral reason for removal, the data here at least
demonstrate the overwhelming disparate impact such removals had
on black prospective jurors.
Unlike with gender, discrimination by opposing sides did
not cancel itself out for race. Rather, the data here show that it was
184 David C. Baldus et al., supra note 24, at 96-97.
185 Lynch & Haney, supra note 26, at 73.
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more difficult for black jurors to be seated on the jury than for white
jurors. A rate of 20% of black prospective jurors ended up on juries
or as alternates while 29% of whites did — with black jurors seated
at roughly 2/3 the rate of white jurors.
The data in Tables 5 (Summary of Removals throughout the
Selection Process, by Race), 6 (Removals for Views on Death, by
Race), and 7 (Percentage of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes by
Race) illustrate the different experiences of a white venire member
and an African American venire member in the set of cases studied.
Black potential jurors were excused for cause at a higher rate than
whites (56% and 33%, respectively) (p < .001, χ2). The results in
Table 6 indicate that a majority of those black individuals removed
for cause were excused because of their opposition to the death
penalty. Of the 234 total black venire members, 130 blacks were
removed for cause, including 75 individuals removed for anti-death
penalty views — representing 58% of blacks removed for cause and
32% of the overall black venire group. By contrast, 72 of 284 whites
removed for cause (constituting 25% of whites removed for cause
and eight percent of the overall white venire group) were excused
because of their opposition to the death penalty. While only two
blacks were excused for favoring the death penalty, approximately
22% of whites excused for cause (63 of 284) were removed for prodeath views.
Although these findings might not remain as strong with
comprehensive data, they illustrate the problematic nature of
removals for cause on the basis of opposition to the death penalty.
Not only did such removals have a disparate impact on women and
African Americans, but it virtually precluded a significant portion of
black prospective jurors from serving on the jury at all. This tension
illustrates the basic catch-22 of “fair cross section” jurisprudence
and jury representativeness in capital cases: it is impossible to
reconcile representativeness with the need for impartiality in capital
punishment cases, since particular groups are more likely to have
strong feelings in opposition.186
Although the overall percentage of blacks removed via
peremptory strike was lower than the overall percentage of whites
removed via peremptory strike (16% and 31%, respectively), the
proportions listed in the second row of Table 5 are misleading. First,
they do not take into account the smaller number of blacks available
186 Price, supra note 7, at 103-04.
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to strike, since such a high proportion was removed at the for-cause
stage. After removing the first row in Table 5 (reducing the pool to
those who were available to be struck), the data show that 37% of
black prospective jurors were struck (thirty-nine out of 104 black
individuals remaining after for-cause removals), whereas 47% of
whites remaining were struck (268 out of 570 white individuals
remaining after for-cause removals). This difference in strikes
calculated using these proportions is not statistically significant (p
= 0.3053, 2-tail fisher exact) and thus shows that whites and blacks
were struck at comparable rates, rather than the twice-higher rate
reflected for whites in Table 5.
But more critically, as illustrated in Table 8, the prosecution
struck 35% of blacks who made it through the voir dire process,
compared to 12% of whites.187 The prosecution used 36 of its 104
strikes on black individuals (36% of its strikes), even though blacks
constituted only 15% of individuals available to be struck.188
The crux of these numbers is that the prosecution struck
187 The racial disparities in the parties’ use of their peremptory challenges were
significant (p < .001, 2-tail Fisher exact).
188 South Carolina procedure appears to dictate that the prosecution goes first in
the parties’ alternating use of their strikes. See Juror Information, S.C. Judicial
Dep’t, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/jurorinfo/jurorSelection.cfm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2017) (“In criminal cases . . . [t]he clerk calls out the name
of the juror. This juror comes forward and stands in front of the jury box. The
clerk says, ‘What sayeth the State?’ The Solicitor, representing the State, will
say either (1) ‘Excuse the juror,’ in which event the juror takes his or her seat
back in the courtroom; or (2) ‘Present the juror,’ or ‘Swear the juror.’ The
clerk will then ask, ‘What sayeth the defendant?’ The defendant’s attorney
may say (1) ‘Excuse the juror,’ in which event the juror takes his or her seat
back in the courtroom; or (2) ‘Swear the juror,’ in which event the juror takes
a seat in the jury box as directed by the clerk.”). If the prosecution used a
strike on a potential juror, the pool available for the defense to strike becomes
smaller. It might be a concern that if the defense used its strikes first in each
trial, the pool that was available for the prosecution to strike would have had
different racial proportions than the one that includes the overall numbers.
The trends observed above weaken somewhat but persist even if it is assumed
that all 200 white venire persons that the defense struck were not available
to the prosecution. If that were the case, the prosecution struck 68 out of 370
whites available to be struck or 18% of them — still substantially lower than
the 36% of blacks struck by the prosecution, which persists after adjusting for
the only three black venire persons struck by defense. The adjusted numbers
would also mean that African Americans were 21% of the pool available to be
struck by the prosecution, but the prosecution used 35% of their strikes on
them. These adjusted numbers remain statistically significant at the .05 level
(p = 0.007949) using a 2-tail Fisher exact test.
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blacks at a rate higher than they were represented and removed
one-third of eligible black jurors. A comparable disparity emerged in
O’Brien and Grosso’s study, where the prosecution struck 52.6% of
eligible black venire members and 25.7% of all other eligible venire
members.189 Of course, the defense had even more dramatically
differing numbers for each race, using only one percent of its strikes
on blacks. But again, where the concerns are jury representativeness,
the jury’s protective function for the defendant, and non-arbitrary
imposition of death sentences, it is easier to forgive the defense’s
discrimination and its countervailing ethical obligations than it is
the prosecution’s discrimination.
The present study unfortunately did not control for raceneutral explanations for the use of strikes, unlike in O’Brien and
Grosso’s study. Potentially, these disparities would not persist or
would weaken with such controls. But, such an outcome seems
unlikely. O’Brien and Gross’s study revealed little difference in
outcomes when they controlled for race-neutral factors.190 Other
studies have shown similar trends.191 It is reasonable to infer here
that the defense was targeting whites and that the prosecution was
targeting blacks.192
Finally, the combined effects of anti-death removals and
prosecutorial strikes had dramatically disparate impacts according
to race. Seventy-five African Americans were removed for antideath views and 36 were struck by the prosecution. Combined,
this excluded group constitutes 47% of the 234-person black venire
pool. Compare this with 72 whites removed for anti-death views
and 68 whites struck by the prosecution — constituting 16% of the
854-person white venire pool. While this is not formally a scheme
to systematically exclude a particular racial group from jury service,
it would seem to be a de facto one.

189
190
191
192

Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1548.
O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7, at 13.
Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1536-40 (discussing other studies).
It appeared from the majority of the trial transcripts that litigants did not raise
a significant number of Batson challenges. One challenge by the prosecution
was observed, where the prosecution alleged discrimination against a white
juror. Since only portions of some transcripts were available, however, it is
possible that Batson challenges were made and not observed.
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VI. Conclusion
The data here illustrate capital punishment’s persistent
problems with jury representativeness and show trends unlikely to be
unique to South Carolina, given their consistency with the literature
on race- and gender-related exclusion during jury selection. First,
although limited in their generalizability and statistical perfection,
disparities related to race and gender in the jury selection process
were pervasive in this study. Most significantly, race apparently
motivated the parties’ use of peremptory strikes, and gender likely
did as well. These data contribute to the knowledge of the ineffectual
impact that Batson and progeny have had in state courts. They also
raise questions about the fairness and constitutionality of the trials
of certain South Carolina inmates currently on death row.
Further, removal of prospective jurors for their opposition
to the death penalty stands in tension with a defendant’s Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights and Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The death-qualification process functioned as a substantial
impediment to jury service by African Americans in this study.
A process with such a dramatic disparate impact on black jurors
flies in the face of Taylor’s holding that “no one racial group may
be systematically excluded from jury service” — particularly when
viewed in tandem with the effects of prosecutorial strikes. This
tension, combined with death qualification’s disparate impact
on women, suggests that states maintaining capital punishment
schemes have embraced a fiction: that it is possible to reconcile
death qualification with society’s interest in, and defendants’ rights
to, impartial, representative juries.

